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THREATS TO THE ELECTION PROCESS
For any military operation, understanding the enemy threat is essential. In election support missions, this principle is no less important. Threats to the election process can be diverse. They can range from threats posed by terrorists and insurgents to threats from discontented political and ethnic groups. The complex political environment that is characteristic of post-conflict scenarios can be a powder keg that an ill-timed or poorly run election can set off. It is, therefore, imperative that military forces conducting security operations, in addition to focusing on the terrorist and insurgent threats, stay closely tuned to political developments so forces can rapidly adjust to emergent crises as they develop. The situation in Afghanistan in 2004 provides an excellent case study for examining the diverse threats faced during post-conflict elections.
The threats to the success of the 2004 Afghan presidential election were primarily from two sources: (1) terrorist and insurgent groups, and (2) rogue Afghan militias and commanders.
The first category, terrorist and insurgent groups, threatened the election process through a range of violent activity. This activity included car bombings, firing of rockets, employment of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping, assassination, and intimidation. In Afghanistan in 2004, such terrorist action was conducted predominantly by Taliban loyalists, though al Qaeda foreign fighters and agents of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hizb-e Islami (HIG) were also active. While these three comprised the main threat, there were also splinter radical groups sympathetic to their causes, such as Jaish-e Muslimeen which kidnapped, and after four weeks released, three UN international staff members in Kabul shortly after the presidential election in October 2004. Afghans considered security to be the number one problem facing the country. For international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the perception of a failed security environment in Afghanistan was a grave concern and threatened to bring the election process to a halt. However, the kandaks were frequently backed up by US conventional and special operations forces and air power. As these operations were frequently in areas far removed from the southern provinces along the Pakistan border, which was the geographic focus of Coalition counterinsurgency efforts, such commitments to peacekeeping reduced the number of Afghan and Coalition forces fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. But, with the critical and symbolic national elections on the horizon, it was clearly not in US interests to see
Afghanistan step back into civil war. Also, despite close US affiliations with some of these regional leaders, the US clearly had to take the side of President Karzai in any factional dispute in order to support the rule of law and the authority of the central government.
Therefore, while Coalition military commanders were loath to commit forces to such endeavors, it was clearly a political imperative to do so whenever the stability of the central government, and thereby the election process, was threatened.
The most significant of these crises occurred from August whole, represented the largest security presence in Afghanistan during the time of the election. Thus, while they were a prime cause of instability, they were at the same time essential for security operations throughout the country. In light of that, AMF issues had to be dealt with very carefully to ensure that the security situation throughout the country was not inadvertently unraveled.
AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS
Military support to post-conflict elections encompasses a very specific mission set within stability operations. 12 The recently published DoD Directive 3000.05 on stability operations specifically states that developing "representative governmental institutions" is one of the key tasks for the military in post-conflict operations. 13 As elections are the means for establishing a democratic government, supporting elections is a critical mission for military forces. Yet, the election process is accomplished over a series of stages which can take years to complete, and the involvement of the military varies throughout. Therefore, it is important to define the role of military forces in each stage of the election process so that military efforts can be efficiently directed.
Elections are inherently political events and the primary role of military forces throughout the election process in a post-conflict nation-building effort is that of an enabler.
Military forces enable elections by establishing a secure environment so that the elections can be conducted. This is achieved by a careful and flexible pursuit of three objectives: (1) defeating threats, (2) enhancing indigenous security force capabilities, and (3) efforts are directed towards the first two objectives. It is the third objective that lacks discussion in joint doctrine and is often little understood. It is, therefore, the focus of this section.
The following is presented as an operational framework for understanding the election process and the role of military forces throughout. Direct support to elections varies depending on the stage of the election being supported. The seven stages below are proposed as the framework for presenting the election process in joint doctrine:
Stage 1: Voter Registration Stage 2: Establishment of the Legal Framework Stage 3: Electoral System and Political Party Preparations Stage 4: Distribution of Election Materials Stage 5: Conduct of Voting Stage 6: Collection and Counting of Ballots Stage 7: Announcement of Results and Establishment of Officials
While the military should not be directly involved in the actual mechanics of each of these stages, 14 it is critical that the military be aware of the ongoing process so that operations can be synchronized with election activities and directly contribute to their success. The following sections discuss key aspects of each stage of the election process and the corresponding role of military forces (see Appendix A for a summary in table form). In practice, the first three stages overlap. However, they are separated in this operational framework due to their distinctly different objectives and the varying role of military forces. For most of Afghanistan's low threat provinces, voter registration was conducted by election officials independent of Coalition forces. However, in the high threat provinces, voter registration was timed to coincide with Coalition security operations. Operation MOUNTAIN STORM, followed by Operation LIGHTNING RESOLVE, were two major operations conducted by Coalition military forces to support the election process. These operations primarily focused on the defeat of terrorist and insurgent threats and on the reconstruction of the Afghan security apparatus. The priority for reconstruction was to enhance and expand the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).
15 Newman, 120. 16 The 2004 Presidential Election in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned, 14.
It was recognized that they would play a vital role in securing the upcoming election, enhancing its legitimacy and improving the national government's credibility. 17 But, these operations also included significant direct support to voter registration efforts. This support included synchronized area security operations, aviation transportation assistance to gain access to dangerous or remote areas, and coordination and liaison with election planners. As a result of these coordinated efforts, over 10.5 million voters were registered in a nine month time period.
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Stage 2: Establishment of the Legal Framework. In a constitutional democracy, the structure of the government, the rules for the formation of political parties, and the procedures for the conduct of an election are all established in two essential documents that define the legal framework for the election. These two documents are the constitution and the electoral law. Of these, the constitution is foundational:
"The constitution is the blueprint for the government and elections are the mechanism for forming that government. The constitution must set out sustainable arrangements for power sharing, and must be seen as credible by the electorate and owned by them through participatory mechanisms."
19
In Afghanistan, the Constitutional Loya Jirga, a traditional Afghan Grand Council with nationwide representation, was the credible, participatory mechanism that met from 17 "Whenever practicable, the larger portion of the military and police duties required to guarantee an impartial election should be provided by the native military organization. This force should be employed to its maximum capacity before employing United States forces. The display of United States armed forces at or near the polling places is kept to a minimum in order to avoid the charge that the Government of the United States has influenced the election, or placed favored candidates in office by the employment of military forces. However, the safety of the Electoral Mission personnel must be considered at all times. The use of the native military organization places the responsibility for law and order where it properly belongs. It also tends to give the electorate the impression that the election is being conducted under the control of their own country. Care must be exercised to prevent the native military organization and individuals composing that organization from exhibiting any partiality. There cannot be a 'free and fair' election if the use of the native constabulary degenerates into a partisan display of force. 27 The distribution effort involves two categories of materials: sensitive (ballot papers and ink bottles) and non-sensitive (empty ballot boxes, polling screens, and furniture).
The distribution of these materials in Afghanistan was conducted in two waves, with non-sensitive materials being moved first. To mitigate against election fraud, ballots were kept secured in central locations as long as possible. They were then distributed along a hub and spokes concept on a timetable that distributed ballots to polling centers just in time for Election Day. With the country organized into eight regions, all the material was pushed from Kabul to each regional center and then onward down the electoral chain from there "to province centers and ultimately to polling centers in districts." 28 All of the material had to be distributed to nearly 5000 polling centers throughout the country, to include some deep in the mountains only accessible by helicopter or donkey.
Coalition military forces provided very limited support in the distribution of nonsensitive materials. However, the distribution of the sensitive ballot papers received close attention and tight security. Each ballot convoy that departed Kabul contained an entire region's worth of ballots-numbering in the millions. These regional convoys were identified 
"Military and police forces are employed to prevent violence to personnel conducting the elections at voting booths, to prevent the destruction or seizure of ballots and electoral records, and for general protection of the populace from guerrilla activities. Protection is furnished the inhabitants in towns, in cities, and along lines of communication in order that registrants and voters may not be prevented from registering or voting due to threats of bodily violence while proceeding to and from registration and polling places."
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For all security forces in Afghanistan-both Afghan and Coalition-Election Day and the days immediately before and afterward constituted a time period of surge operations to establish presence and area security dominance in all key population centers. "Security measures were put in place to facilitate the protection of the polling sites, the 120,000 election workers and up to 10.5 million voters." 31 JEMB's goal was to have six policemen at every polling center to provide immediate physical security for election workers, voters and 29 For the remote region of Herat, the Coalition provided C-130 support to JEMB to lift the ballots directly there from Kabul, thereby saving them the risky four or five day journey around the Ring Road. In this instance, JEMB could not afford to contract aircraft for the trip and had instead opted for the more economical journey by truck. The Coalition, however, changed that plan since it was more economical for the Coalition to fly it themselves than to secure it for the entire journey by ground. 30 Small Wars Manual, 14-5. 31 The 2004 Presidential Election in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned, 17.
ballots. In addition to establishing presence at polling centers, a combination of police and military security measures were put into effect throughout all major population centers to enhance overall security. Such measures included dismounted patrols, mounted patrols, vehicle check points, aircraft overflights and the establishment of multiple quick reaction forces. Due to the desire to project the image of an Afghan election, indigenous forces were extensively employed to conduct these security missions.
ANA kandaks were the key indigenous security force throughout the whole election time period. As a multi-ethnic Afghan force, the kandaks represented the power of the national government and the hope of a new Afghanistan in which all ethnicities could get along. As such, kandaks were usually popularly received by the local people and were in high demand by both the Afghan government and Coalition commanders. As election security planning progressed, the ANA were extensively incorporated due to their effectiveness and the Afghan identity they provided to the elections. For the 2004 presidential election, the ANA fielded 11 kandaks totaling 11,800 troops. These were dispersed throughout Afghanistan to the key population centers and potential hot spots.
In election operations, however, police are preferred over military forces as they create greater legitimacy in demonstrating the rule of law. In Afghanistan, the number of trained Afghan National Police (ANP) had grown to around 25,000 by the time of the presidential election. 32 Though less capable than the ANA, the ANP were critical to election security operations. The Afghan Ministry of Interior also designated a newly graduated police academy class as the ANP's Rapid Action Division (RAD) to provide security 32 Insufficient communications, transportation and weapons frequently hampered the ANP. Furthermore, they were often at odds with local militia forces vying for the status as the "keeper of the peace." exclusively for election related activities. 33 The RAD provided the JEMB with a flexible force at their disposal to provide security at sites they deemed of critical importance.
Coalition forces directly supported Afghan security forces in high threat areas and were postured to quickly react to potential crises in others. Combined security operations with ANA and ANP were conducted on key routes and in key population centers. On Election Day, all security forces in Afghanistan achieved area security dominance by maintaining a very active and overt presence. They also imposed strict force protection measures, such as the restriction of vehicular traffic around polling centers. These combined efforts proved extremely effective in deterring attacks and in defeating the ones that did occur. decision was made to consolidate and count ballots at eight regional counting centers. This also simplified the security equation.
As polling centers closed on Election Day, the ballot boxes were secured by election workers and police. They were then transported to district and provincial collection points from which they were transported to regional counting centers where the votes were tallied.
The majority of the collection process was completed within five days of the election, but in some cases, due to terrain and weather, the ballot boxes took over a week to reach the counting centers. All regional counting centers had an ANA and ANP presence for security.
Coalition forces during this stage focused on route security and on monitoring the security of the counting centers. In high threat areas, JEMB truck convoys moving ballots from provincial collection points to the regional counting centers were provided Coalition military escorts in addition to their Afghan police or army escorts. In some of the more isolated and remote areas, Coalition helicopters and C-130s assisted in collecting ballot boxes. Once all the ballot boxes had been accounted for, the tallying of the vote was completed. The second coordination mechanism was the establishment of a weekly meeting in Kabul by the JEMBS security director to facilitate coordination and planning between all the relevant security and political organizations. It was the meeting to attend for anyone interested in election planning. The coordination that occurred during this meeting was critical to obtaining unity of effort between the wide variety of organizations involved in the election. 38 The meeting covered all aspects of the election to include political developments, security concerns and logistics. As a side bar to this meeting, a select group convened to conduct intelligence sharing. This was a two-way street as the JEMB security office received threat information from sources outside the Coalition's intelligence reporting architecture.
These meetings began in June and continued right up to the election in October. Just as this meeting was vital to effect coordination at the national level, similar meetings occurred at the regional and even provincial levels-although with less regularity and with varying degrees of success in the different regions.
The third mechanism was the establishment of an Election Security Operations
Center ( Intelligence. Sharing intelligence with JEMB security personnel was critical and procedures and mechanisms had to be established to facilitate this. As mentioned previously, the perception of a lack of security was a major concern to UN personnel. One means of alleviating UN concerns was the implementation of frequent intelligence sharing. This enabled CJTF representatives to paint an accurate threat picture for JEMB security personnel so that they could be more informed in their operational decision making. Likewise, the reporting and analysis of threats that came through UN channels served as a valuable source of information to supplement Coalition analysis. Establishing the mechanisms for sharing intelligence proved to be a challenge due to classification restrictions. This required the development of some specific guidance and procedures for sharing threat information with the UN. Logistics. Obtaining authority and funding to provide aviation transportation assistance to JEMB was the biggest hurdle that had to be overcome in providing logistics support to the election. This was one a frustration for tactical level commanders who were trying to support JEMB personnel in their movements to or through dangerous areas. The hurdle was primarily a legal one since approval to fly civilian personnel, per DoD directives, required a waiver signed by the CJTF commander for each mission due to liability reasons.
This restriction hamstrung efforts to support election officials as it was not adaptable to the fluid nature of election operations. JEMB personnel, therefore, could not take advantage of opportune military lift. With the UN only having five helicopters in Afghanistan, their air mobility was extremely limited and widely dispersed. In the meantime, the Coalition was flying numerous sorties into and out of some of the remote and dangerous areas and could have greatly facilitated JEMB's access into those areas. Coordinated flights did occur on many occasions when collaborative planning with JEMB could be done in advance. But, the 39 There was one instance when a rocket was fired at President Karzai's helicopter while he was making a campaign visit to Ghazni. After the attack occurred, the visit was aborted.
requirement to obtain CJTF level approval imposed a bureaucratic restriction that hindered commanders from being able to provide more responsive support.
Furthermore, launching dedicated aviation sorties in support of JEMB operations fell into a category of airlift outside the scope of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission and by law required DoS approval and reimbursement. This was most stringently applied to C-130 missions flown to move election materials or President Karzai. These missions were usually referred to the secretary level in Washington for approval. One interesting dimension to this funding issue was that DoS had already donated millions of dollars to JEMB to specifically support election logistics, such as the contracting of commercial aircraft. Yet, the reality on the ground was that contract aviation support was frequently not a viable option, and despite US donations to JEMB, they were still operating on a constrained budget. In the end, the authority and funding for the aviation missions in support of ballot movements was approved-though it required the submission to DoS of a detailed schedule of all aviation sorties. The weeks long effort required to produce such a schedule highlighted the fact that JEMB lacked a logistics planning staff. The few personnel they did have were frequently consumed by current operations. It was only when the CJTF provided a dedicated logistics planner to JEMB-just a few weeks out from the election-that a detailed distribution schedule was established and the Coalition support requirements assessed.
Rules of Engagement (ROE).
As the election neared, the ROE needed to be modified and units repositioned and tasked to ensure that JEMB/UNAMA compounds were secure. On September 12, 2004, a rioting crowd in the city of Herat burned the compounds of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Development Program (UNDP) in a sign of protest over Ismail Khan's removal as provincial governor. 40 The UN personnel on these compounds were evacuated by US and ANA forces, but the compounds were not protected. As a result, the infrastructure on these compounds, which had been the hub for JEMB operations throughout the whole western region of the country, was destroyed.
Following this attack, the UN seriously considered suspending operations in the entire western region. The UN was not only concerned with the safety of their personnel, but also the loss of infrastructure which could not easily or quickly be replaced. With the presidential election only a month away, a UN suspension of operations would have made a nation-wide election impossible.
Following this crisis, to alleviate UN security concerns, Coalition forces were tasked to ensure the security of all UN compounds within their areas of operation, defending them with deadly force if required. While it could be argued that the ROE to support this already existed, the CJTF command clarified the ROE in case there was any doubt. Furthermore, the importance of this task relative to the success of the election process was communicated to subordinate commanders. In some areas, this order resulted in Coalition forces being repositioned to provide immediate security on UN compounds until Afghan forces could be assigned this task. With this ROE, Coalition forces ran an increased risk of confronting a rioting crowd. This potential led to a request by subordinate commanders for non-lethal capabilities-something that most CJTF units were neither equipped nor trained for at that time. Coalition military support to a post-conflict election process can be critical to its success. Without the establishment of a secure environment, an election is prone to failure.
CONCLUSIONS
Rather than promoting the credibility of the government and the abilities of indigenous security forces, extensive violence at the polls can make the election demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the government. Consideration of the timing of the elections is critical to ensure that they are not conducted before the government and indigenous security forces are set up for success. That is not to say that all threats must be defeated prior to the election.
The recent elections in both Iraq and Afghanistan highlight that elections can be conducted despite the threat posed by insurgent forces or discontented political parties. Through close planning with election officials and the synchronization of security efforts, the challenging election process can be completed successfully.
Key to this success is that military forces understand their role throughout all seven stages of the election process. The framework presented here is provided to assist military commanders and planners in crafting plans for supporting the various stages of a postconflict election. It is recommended that this operational framework be incorporated into joint doctrine for post-conflict election support missions.
Election support missions are a critical component of stability operations. Given
America's commitment to the advancement of democracy, additional missions in the future will undoubtedly occur. Therefore, joint doctrine for stability operations needs to incorporate an operational framework that captures the entire election process and defines the role of military forces. Doing so will ensure that the commanders and troops conducting these future operations are properly prepared to conduct them. 
